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Abstract 
The fiscal gap calculates the change in fiscal policy settings needed to achieve a 
particular debt target at some point in the future.  This working paper calculates fiscal 
gaps for New Zealand under a range of scenarios, including alternative spending growth, 
debt targets and interest rates.  A positive (negative) fiscal gap indicates that a permanent 
increase (decrease) in the primary surplus is required to achieve a selected debt target in 
a particular terminal year.  The scenarios suggest that under a range of alternative 
assumptions the fiscal gap out to 2051 is positive.  These results are in accord with 
previous long-term fiscal projections, which, unlike the fiscal gap, have not been explicit 
about the nature of long-term fiscal imbalances.  The analysis provides a platform for the 
further examination of potential long-term fiscal imbalances under a wider range of 
assumptions (e.g., around demographics, labour force participation, health spending) as 
well as alternative modelling techniques that allow for uncertainty.  
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Long-term fiscal projections and 
their relationship with the 
intertemporal budget constraint:  
An application to New Zealand 
1 Introduction 
Developments in fiscal policy and theory over recent years have increasingly taken on a 
longer-term focus.  For example, in a recent summary article, John Taylor acknowledges 
the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers influencing short-run business cycle fluctuations and 
suggests that the focus of discretionary fiscal policy should be on longer-term issues 
(Taylor, 2001).  David Romer’s recent text on macroeconomics starts its chapter on 
budget deficits and fiscal policy with an explicit consideration of the government’s budget 
constraint through time (Romer, 2001).  The longer-term metric for evaluating fiscal policy 
is typically the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (IBC).  The IBC is based 
around the notion that all government spending must eventually be financed, either in the 
current period through taxes or over time through interest on debt.    
The 1990s saw the development of a variety of fiscal policy frameworks internationally 
that recognise the importance of longer-term implications of current fiscal policies and 
tend to focus on the paths of deficits and debt through time.  Examples include the “Code 
for Fiscal Stability” in the United Kingdom; the “Charter of Budget Honesty” in Australia; 
the “Maastricht Treaty” and “Stability and Growth Pact” in Europe. In New Zealand, the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 requires the setting of long-term objectives for fiscal 
balances and stocks, as well as the publication of long-term fiscal projections.   
The longer-term fiscal projections required under the Fiscal Responsibility Act provide a 
guide to the broad requirements for sustainable fiscal policy.  For example, an assumed 
tax reduction (spending increase) without a change to spending (tax) assumptions could 
see a rising debt profile through time.  Although a Government could signal a future 
reduction in spending (increase in taxes), the requirement to publish projections increases 
the transparency around the implied policy change.  The credibility of fiscal policy is likely 
to be undermined by projections that indicate fiscal objectives will not be met over a 
reasonable period of time given plausible economic and policy assumptions.    
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This paper uses the New Zealand Treasury’s long-term fiscal model (LTFM), the model 
that generates the long-term fiscal projections required under the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act.
 1
  The LTFM is also used to generate fiscal “scenarios” over longer time horizons 
(e.g., 50 years).  The LTFM builds in an estimate of the effect of population change on 
government spending in the future.  Since there is a tendency for New Zealand’s 
population to age (in the sense that those aged over 65 will comprise a larger share of the 
total population), then use of the LTFM builds in the effect of population ageing on fiscal 
variables (see for example, Polackova, 1997).
2 , 3
 
Long-term fiscal projections need to be interpreted cautiously.  The LTFM generates debt 
as a residual.  Over long-time horizons, any “mismatch” between projected revenue and 
expenses will see an increasing debt-to-output ratio.   Such outcomes are unlikely to 
actually eventuate, as there will be a range of adjustments, both in terms of government 
policy and by the private sector.  The fiscal projections based on the LTFM are therefore 
likely to over-estimate the deterioration in the fiscal position.  The projections are best 
interpreted as “current policy” projections, where this is an approximation of the current 
role of government via specific expense and revenue parameters (see Section 5).          
Unconstrained debt projections are not particularly useful in terms of communicating the 
extent of implied policy change.   Resolving this issue requires a consideration of the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint (IBC), which requires that all government 
spending must eventually be financed, either in the current period through taxes or over 
time through interest on debt.    
There are a number of numerical long-term fiscal indicators based around the concept of 
an IBC.  Generational accounting examines the effect on different generations of 
alternative ways of satisfying the government’s IBC (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1999; 
Baker, 1999).  The concept of Comprehensive Net Worth (CNW) set out by Bradbury, 
Brumby and Skilling (1999) also centres on the government’s IBC.  CNW is broader than 
net worth because it incorporates the present discounted value of all future revenue and 
expenditure flows.  
The fiscal gap is also based around the concept of the government’s IBC.  The fiscal gap 
calculates the change in fiscal policy settings needed to achieve a particular debt target at 
some point in the future (Auerbach, 1994; 1997).    This change can be calculated in 
terms of the adjustment needed now, or what is required in the future if adjustment is 
delayed.  The change in policy can be in the form of adjustments to taxes and/or 
spending.   The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly publishes estimates of 
the fiscal gap.  Recent work by the OECD on the fiscal implications of population ageing 
has considered a similar measure (OECD, 2001).    
                                                
1
    The LTFM is described in Woods (2000) and at www.treasury.govt.nz/ltfm.  Further details on 
the LTFM structure and assumptions used for the fiscal gap scenarios are available on request from the 
author.    
2
    The projections required under the Fiscal Responsibility Act are termed “Progress Outlooks”. They 
must cover a minimum of 10 years and are included in the Government’s annual Fiscal Strategy Report. The 
projections are for the variables specified in the long-term fiscal objectives (e.g., expenses, revenues, 
operating balance, debt and net worth). The terms “projection” and “scenario” carry a different status to short-
term fiscal “forecasts”.  The projections and scenarios generated by the LTFM involve a higher degree of 
uncertainty and are based on a relatively small set of key long-run economic, demographic and fiscal 
assumptions. These assumptions are set out in the text and Appendix. 
3
    Fiscal projections of this type became a feature of the retirement income debate during the early 1990s 
(see Task Force on Private Provision for Retirement, 1992; Briggs, Malcolm, O’Donovan and Vandersyp, 
1992; Cook and Savage, 1995).   
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The fiscal gap calculations in this working paper provide information on the long-term path 
of budget balances, abstracting from shorter-term influences such as the business cycle.  
Closing a fiscal gap via a permanent change in policy settings amounts to a long-term “tax 
smoothing” approach (see Section 2).  The long-term budget balances implied by such an 
approach can be linked with two procedures used by the New Zealand Treasury to assess 
uncertainty around the budget balance over the short-run.  Buckle, Kim and Tam (2001) 
use a procedure for identifying the ex ante fiscal balance required to achieve, with a given 
probability, a desired ex post budget balance for alternative short-term fiscal planning 
horizons.  In their approach, the budget balances implied by the fiscal gap could act as the 
desired ex post target and the probability of realising this target during a specified time 
horizon can be deduced from the probability of past shocks to the budget balance.  In a 
similar context, the budget balances implied by the fiscal gap are structural and ignore the 
short-term effects of the business cycle.  Tam and Kirkham (2001) set out the Treasury’s 
procedure for estimating the cyclical component of the actual budget balance.          
This working paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 sets out the analytical framework 
used to derive the fiscal gap.   Sections 3 and 4 discuss the elements involved in 
calculating the fiscal gap, with reference to overseas applications, particularly for the 
United States.   Section 5 sets outs the structure of the LTFM and key assumptions.  
Section 6 presents fiscal gap calculations for New Zealand under a range of scenarios.   
For terminal dates up until around 2030, calculated fiscal gaps are negative under the 
Baseline assumptions, indicating that the primary surplus could be reduced.  However, 
under the Baseline and other assumptions, the fiscal gap out to 2051 is positive.  Section 
7 sets out policy issues and caveats and Section 8 concludes.  
2 Analytical  framework 
2.1  The intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) 
The framework used here draws on the specification of the IBC used by Buiter (1995, 
2001), Wells (1996) and Romer (2001).  The specification is stylised in that it excludes 
capital spending and income from government trading enterprises.  The government 
budget identity is given by: 
  ) ( 1 1 − − − + = + t t t t t B B T rB G   (1a) 
where G is current spending on goods, services and transfers, T denotes taxes, and r is 
the real interest rate.  For simplicity, r is assumed to be constant and there is no inflation.  
B is the end-of-period stock of debt and t denotes a time period (where t would denote a 
year if G and T represented annual flows).  In equation (1a), government current 
spending, including debt servicing is financed from taxes and changes in debt.   
Rearrangement gives the equation for the evolution of debt between period t and t-1 (i.e., 
over one year if t denotes a year): 
  t t t t t G T rB B B + − + = − − 1 1   (1b) 
The government’s primary balance, PB, excludes all transactions involving debt and is 
defined as:   
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  t t t G T PB − =   (2) 
A positive value of PBt indicates a primary surplus arising from the flow of T and G 
transactions during the period t.  The overall fiscal or “operating” balance for period t (OBt) 
is defined as:  
  1 − − = t t t rB PB OB   (3) 
The primary balance isolates the underlying spending and tax paths from any dynamics 
created by the interaction of the interest rate and debt (or financial assets).  This is 
important in the context of the fiscal gap because it is assumed that the fiscal authority 
can directly influence T and/or G and change them if necessary to satisfy the IBC.     
The IBC is concerned with the future paths of fiscal and economic variables.  By repeated 
substitution, debt at time N (i.e., BN) is a function of its initial value and the entire series of 
primary balances realised between the initial period and N.  If the stock of outstanding 
debt grows at a rate less than r, then in the limit, the present discounted value of terminal 









   (4) 
 
If this terminal condition is satisfied, then the government’s IBC holds if the excess of 
primary surpluses over primary deficits, in present value terms (the right-hand-side of 












B   (5) 
 
This expression is sometimes described as the government’s present value budget 
constraint (PVBC).  Now let debt and the primary balance be defined as ratios-to-output, b 
and pb respectively, where bt = Bt / Yt , pbt = PBt / Yt  and where Yt is real output in period t.  
Assume that the economy operates with a long-run real interest rate above the long-run 
real growth rate of output (g), where the latter is also assumed to be constant.
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4
    The assumptions imposed to derive the IBC impose a no Ponzi finance condition. A no Ponzi finance 
condition rules out the possibility of debt being issued at some date and being rolled over forever (see Romer, 
2001 Chapter 11). It is also assumed that the real interest rate is exogenous. Section 4 discusses further the 
relationship between the real interest rate and the real growth rate.    
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2.2  The fiscal gap 
Following Auerbach (1994), the fiscal gap can be defined as the immediate and 
permanent change in the primary balance (brought about by tax changes and/or spending 
changes) that, if projections prove accurate, would be needed to bring the debt-to-gross 
domestic product (GDP) ratio at some date T in the future to the level that prevails at 
some initial date t (see Section 3 below for further discussion).   
The fiscal gap can be “closed” through changes in taxes (T) and/or (non-interest or 
primary) spending (G) that permanently alter the primary balance. Closing a fiscal gap 
does not imply eliminating any current difference between taxes and primary spending, as 
the primary balance may be non-zero in the initial year.     
Based on Auerbach (1994, p.170), and using the notation from above, the change in the 
































































b g r pb   (8) 
 
where T denotes the terminal year, t is the initial year and pbs is the primary balance as a 
share of GDP in year s.  A positive value for ∆ pb from equation (8) implies that a 
permanent increase in the primary surplus (or a permanent reduction in the primary 
deficit) is needed to ensure that the initial debt-to-GDP ratio (bt) is attained in the terminal 
year.   A negative fiscal gap means that a permanent reduction in the primary balance is 
consistent with returning to the initial debt-to-GDP ratio in the terminal year.  A fiscal gap 
of zero indicates that the projected path of the primary balance is such that the initial debt-
to-GDP ratio is attained in the terminal year.   
If the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate of output (i.e., if (r – g) > 0), and there 
is some initial debt, then pbs = 0 for all periods beyond t will imply a non-zero fiscal gap.  
In these circumstances, expression (8) reduces to ∆ pb = (r – g)bt.  A primary balance of 
zero will see debt servicing add to debt.  With r > g debt servicing will add to debt faster 
than the rate of output growth and the debt ratio will increase.  Primary surpluses will be 
required at some point to stabilise the debt ratio.   
The fiscal gap indicator is similar to the “tax gap” set out in Blanchard (1993).  The tax gap 
is the difference between the actual tax rate and a constant tax rate that ensures fiscal 
sustainability in terms of the IBC.
5
  The fiscal gap is also similar to the measure of 
“Economic Net Worth” (ENW) set out in Wells (1996).  ENW is defined by the present 
value difference between a time− H forecast debt ratio and a desired debt ratio.  ENW is 
zero if on unchanged fiscal policy the path of primary surpluses is consistent with the 
desired debt ratio at the terminal date.  The methodology allows calculation of the 
                                                
5 
     For a further discussion on fiscal sustainability and the construction of relevant indicators (including 
tax gaps) see the papers in Bank of Italy (2000). Chapters 1 and 2 in Verbon and van Winden (1993) cover 
similar issues.    
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proportional change to the sequence of primary balances needed to meet the terminal 
date debt ratio.  
Recent work by the OECD on the fiscal implications of population ageing has considered 
a similar measure.  For a “stylised” OECD country (i.e., one which has the features of the 
median OECD country) the analysis calculates the change in the primary balance needed 
to ensure a broadly unchanged debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the projection period 
(2050) (see OECD, 2001; Dang, Antolin and Oxley, 2001).    
Calculating a fiscal gap using equation (8) requires projections of future primary balances 
and projections of future interest rates and growth rates.  These elements are discussed 
in Sections 3 and 4 with reference to overseas applications of the methodology.     
2.3  The fiscal gap and long-term fiscal policy 
Taxes distort behaviour and the costs of these distortions are typically referred to as the 
deadweight loss of taxation or the excess burden of taxation.  Because of the increasing 
marginal tax burden, an optimal tax regime would have the property that marginal and 
average tax rates remain broadly constant over time rather than switching between low 
and high rates.  This is why the approach is often termed “tax smoothing” (see Barro, 
1979). 
Credit Suisse First Boston (1995) analyse these issues given the key characteristics of the 
New Zealand economy (i.e., small, open, presence of distorting taxes, openness to world 
capital markets, emigration and local demographics).  They conclude that current and 
capital spending plans should be determined independently of the debt decision, and on 
the basis of efficiency considerations.  Optimal tax policy would plan for a constant 
average (and marginal) tax rate through all future periods.  Under a constant tax rate, this 
approach will involve budget deficits and surpluses (and so fluctuations in debt) when 
there are fluctuations in government spending and when there are fluctuations in the tax 
base (for example, real income).  This is in contrast to a “balanced budget” approach, 
where taxes and/or spending are changed through time so that debt is held constant.  
They analyse the case of “unbalanced” growth in government spending (i.e., spending 
grows faster than GDP).  The projected effect of population ageing on future primary 
spending means this is more relevant than the “balanced” growth case.  The IBC would 
imply a higher immediate and constant tax rate to avoid subsequent tax increases.   
Assets would be accumulated to finance some portion of future spending out of interest 
income to meet the higher future government spending arising from population ageing.  
Closing a fiscal gap via a one-off permanent change (now or in the future) can be viewed 
as long-term tax smoothing in a deterministic setting.  The fiscal gap is closed either by 
permanently increasing taxes, or holding taxes constant and permanently changing 
spending (or some combination).  Regardless, debt becomes the residual.   
An evaluation of the relative merits of tax smoothing versus balanced-budgets is outside 
the scope of this paper.  For a given unbalanced path of spending, the fiscal gap merely 
provides a way of quantifying the financing consequences of tax smoothing for fiscal flow 
and stock variables.   
The approach taken to financing a given path of long-term government spending would 
influence the formulation of long-term fiscal objectives under the Fiscal Responsibility Act  
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1994.  For instance, a policy to smooth taxes given the path of future government 
spending would mean running sustained operating surpluses, followed by an extended 
period of operating deficits.  This would need to be incorporated into the long-term 
operating balance, debt and net worth objectives required by the Act.  A balanced budget 
approach, which entails altering, taxes and/or spending would require changes to the 
long-term objective for expenses.   
3  Projecting primary balances 
When the terminal date T in equation (8) is set at less than infinity the fiscal gap is solving 
to ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio returns to the initial ratio in the specified terminal 
year.  Taxes and/or spending are adjusted to generate a path of primary balances that 
returns the debt ratio to the initial value.  (It is possible to specify alternative debt targets.)  
Although an infinite time horizon seems the most relevant for government, it raises 
questions about the appropriate “current policy” projection of the primary balance given 
the uncertainty behind the parameters affecting taxes and spending.  Shorter-term, finite 
horizons are often used to provide a “consistency check”. 
The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2000) calculates fiscal gaps over a 75-year 
time horizon (the same time period used by the US Social Security trustees in their 
projections).  In the context of population ageing, Blanchard suggests the application of a 
“long-term tax gap” for a 50-year period that, at a minimum, should include major transfer 
programmes and use simple assumptions about other spending programs.  In calculating 
ENW, Wells (1996) sets the time horizon H (analogous to T above) to match the lifetime 
applicable to the youngest existing generation (i.e., the generation born in the initial year, 
which gives H = 75 years).  
In his application of the fiscal gap to the long-term US fiscal position, Auerbach (1994) 
considers terminal dates of 2031, 2071 and ∞ .  Auerbach (1994, 1997) and Auerbach and 
Gale (1999a) argue that terminal dates set at less than infinity are arbitrary and understate 
the magnitude of the US fiscal balance because the primary balance is projected to be in 
deficit in the years approaching 2070 and those that follow.
6
  Ongoing primary deficits 
result from their assumption that taxes to GDP are constant, and Social Security and 
Medicare maintain their 2070 expenditure shares of GDP in subsequent years as the 
population structure stabilises.  These assumptions allow for the calculation of a 
“permanent” time horizon measure of the fiscal gap.  For the US this will be greater than 
the fiscal gap calculated for a finite horizon T.  This is because the primary deficits 
projected after 2070, which are included in the permanent measure, are larger than those 
in a typical year up to 2070. 
Table 1 summarises a selection of US fiscal gap estimates generated by the CBO and 
Auerbach and Gale to provide a sense of how estimated fiscal gaps vary according to the 
choice of T and how they change with updated projections of primary balances.  Table 1 
indicates that including years after 2070 has a considerable impact on the calculation of 
the size of the US fiscal gap and the calculations of the fiscal gap change through time. 
                                                
6
    Auerbach (1994, 1997) and Auerbach and Gale (1999a,b) use the CBO’s long-term fiscal projections, 
with some modifications.   
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According to the CBO (1997), around two-thirds of the improvement in the fiscal gap from 
5.4% in May 1996, to 4.1% in March 1997 comes from changes in their 10-year 
projections of taxes and spending.   
Table 1 – US Fiscal Gaps (% of GDP) 
CBO (1997, 1998, 1999)  Auerbach and Gale (1999a,b) 
1996 May  5.4% (t = 1997, T = 2070)     
1997 March  4.1% (t = 1997, T = 2070)     










0.39% (t = 1998, T = 2070) 
1.53% (t = 1998, T = ∞ ) 
1.30% (t = 1998, T = ∞ ) 
Note: The Auerbach and Gale results are not directly comparable to those of the CBO even over a similar time horizon because of 
methodological differences. These relate mainly to the exclusion of feedback effects in the Auerbach and Gale calculations. The CBO 
projections include feedbacks between the fiscal position, national saving and investment, and real interest rates. The effect of the 
fiscal deficit on investment is assumed to be partially offset by increased private saving and foreign borrowing. There are no economic 
feedbacks from tax rates to labour supply or private saving, or between government investment and private sector output.  
Tax and spending assumptions also influence the size of the US fiscal gap.  Beyond the 
first 10-years the CBO projections use “simple rules” reflecting historical patterns.  For 
example, discretionary spending is held constant as a share of GDP so that discretionary 
programs rise with inflation and real economic growth.  If discretionary spending after 
2009 is increased only at the rate of inflation (i.e., there is no real growth in spending and 
so, with real GDP growing this will involve a falling share of GDP), the 75-year CBO fiscal 
gap falls from 0.5% to minus 0.7%.  
Auerbach and Gale (1999b) note that the baseline assumption for discretionary spending 
in the first 10 years sees its share-to-GDP fall from 6.6% in 1998 to 5% in 2009.  As a 
result, more than half of the 10-year surplus is based on this assumption.  If discretionary 
spending were held at its 1999 share of GDP, Auerbach and Gale’s estimate of the 
(permanent horizon) fiscal gap increases from 1.3% to 3.17%.  
The CBO baseline projections assume that tax receipts remain constant as a share of 
GDP after the first 10-years.  Auerbach and Gale (1999b) estimate that somewhere 
between 79% and 96% of the recent surge in revenue is assumed to be permanent in the 
10-year projections.  
The CBO (1999) acknowledge that the tax-to-GDP share at the end of the 10-year 
baseline projection is higher than in any year during the post-WWII period, except 1998. If 
receipts are assumed to return to the level in the decade preceding 1994 (19.5% of GDP), 
the fiscal gap increases from 0.5% to 1.6% of GDP.  
The assumptions around revenues and expenses in the Treasury’s projections are 
discussed in Section 5.   
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4  Projecting interest rates and growth rates 
4.1  Economic growth, the golden rule and dynamic 
efficiency 
Consider first the closed economy version of the neoclassical growth model (Solow,1956; 
Swan,1956).  The growth path of output is determined by the growth rates of the labour 
force (n) and labour-augmenting technical change (µ ).  Labour augmenting technical 
change increases the productivity of labour, while allowing factor shares to remain 
constant for a given capital− output ratio.  Growth in effective labour is the sum of growth in 
actual labour and the rate at which it is augmented (n + µ ).  In steady-state, output per 
worker and real wages grow at µ .  Furthermore, capital grows at the same rate as output 
and so the capital− output ratio is constant.  With output and capital growing at the same 
rate as the effective labour force (i.e., n + µ ), output per effective worker and capital per 
effective-worker (capital intensity) are constant.
7
  
The level of per-worker consumption is maximised at a capital-to-effective labour ratio kgold 
that is determined by n + µ .  This is the so-called “golden rule” of capital accumulation in a 
closed economy without capital depreciation.  At this point the marginal product of capital 
equals n + µ , and assuming perfect capital markets, this equals the real interest rate r.  
Levels of capital intensity above that implied by the golden rule denote a region of 
dynamic inefficiency.  Reducing capital intensity toward kgold requires a fall in the 
(exogenous) saving ratio, which sees the marginal product of capital rise and r increase to 
n + µ .  
If capital intensity is below the golden rule rate, the economy is in the dynamically efficient 
region.  An increase in capital intensity requires capital accumulation via a higher saving 
ratio.  As capital intensity increases toward kgold, the marginal product of capital falls, as 
does r, toward n + µ .   Based on the above, it is common to see an economy described as 
dynamically efficient if the real interest rate is equal to, or greater than the real GDP 
growth rate.  
In a closed economy operating in the dynamically efficient region, the decline in the 
marginal product of capital as adjustment to the golden rule occurs implies a fall in the 
rate of return on saving.  In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, world 
capital markets set the real interest rate.  The return to saving is set by the exogenous 
world real interest rate.     
Even if the real interest rate is, in the longer run, determined on world capital markets, it 
will not necessarily be appropriate to assume a constant real interest rate.  The chosen 
profile of the real interest rate may need to reflect worldwide influences, including 
demographic change.  For a small, open economy like New Zealand, the impact of 
                                                
7
    For details see Wells (1995, Chapter 13) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 1). The LTFM 
only projects the path of output using labour input projections and exogenous labour productivity growth (see 
Appendix). See Benge and Wells (2001) for an analysis in the open economy context. Stiroh (1998) provides 
a useful survey of the growth models used in the fiscal projections of four US government agencies. 
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domestic demographics and economic growth on interest rates is likely to be minor.   
Worldwide demographics are likely to be more relevant.   
Population ageing is likely to see a slowdown in labour force growth, slower economic 
growth and falling returns to domestic capital, creating an incentive to invest offshore. 
Global capital markets may facilitate intergenerational capital shifts in response to 
differences in rates of population ageing across regions.  In an examination of the various 
issues, Diamond (1999) concludes that on balance, slower projected economic growth 
may reduce the return on capital (bonds and equities), but the effect is probably 
considerably less than one-for-one (for a summary of these issues, see the Appendix in 
McCulloch and Frances, 2001). 
4.2  Interest rate and growth rate assumptions used in 
practice 
Long-term fiscal projections generally rely on an assumption of dynamic efficiency, so that 
r > g.  For example, in their 50-year fiscal projections for major OECD countries, Chand 
and Jaeger (1996) project GDP growth on the basis of labour-augmenting technical 
change and labour inputs (where the latter is influenced by demographic change). They 
assume real interest rates of 3.5%, which are on average around 2 percentage points in 
excess of the real GDP growth rates.  
Both Auerbach (1994, 1997) and the CBO investigate the effects of different interest rate 
assumptions on the fiscal gap.  Auerbach (1994) finds that reducing the differential 
between r and g reduces the size of the fiscal gap over time horizons of around 30 and 70 
years as the lower cost of debt servicing dominates the calculation.  Recall from Section 3 
that Auerbach assumes that primary deficits persist beyond 2070.  In this case, projected 
primary deficits over the permanent time horizon tend to dominate the calculation.  So, 
with a lower interest rate, primary deficits in the future, which are larger as a share of 
GDP, matter more.   Over the permanent horizon the fiscal gap increases when the 
excess of r over g is reduced.  
The CBO’s 10-year fiscal projections assume that the interest rate on government debt 
exceeds the growth rate of output.  The differential is assumed to increase through time 
as rising fiscal deficits crowd out investment, interest rates rise and real economic growth 
slows.  (The projections assume that when the government holds assets these pay the 
same average interest rate as government debt.)  
The recent OECD study on the fiscal implications of population ageing utilised national 
projection models with an agreed set of macroeconomic and demographic assumptions 
(see OECD, 2001; Dang, Antolin and Oxley, 2001).  OECD analysis indicates that a range 
of factors will affect future real interest rates, including growth across regions and saving 
and investment balances (see Turner, Giorno, De Serres, Vourc’h and Richardson, 1998).   
Given the high degree of uncertainty around the real interest variable, the cross-country 
OECD exercise proposed that countries use a (constant) real risk free interest rate of 4% 
over the period to 2050.
8
 
                                                
8
   In their reference scenario, Turner et. al. (1998) project a gradual rise in the world real interest rate 
from 5% to 5.7% by around 2030, followed by a decline to just below 5% by 2100. This rate is calculated as 
the weighted average of real interest rates (net of any sovereign risk premium) in each region where the  
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5  The Treasury’s long-term fiscal model 
and fiscal gap calculations   
The budget identity of equation (1) and the subsequent fiscal gap of equation (8) are 
stylised.  The formulation of the Treasury’s long-term fiscal model (LTFM) captures all the 
key variables required for the fiscal gap calculation (r, g, bt, and pbs).  The LTFM can trace 
out the path of relevant fiscal balance and stock variables under alternative economic, 
demographic and fiscal assumptions.  The model is based on Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice (GAAP) and incorporates a fuller set of assumptions around 
expenses, revenues, assets and liabilities than embodied in equations (1) and (8).    
It is important to note the following features embodied in the LTFM when interpreting 
estimates of the fiscal gap generated using the LTFM.  First, although official population 
and labour force projections are made out to 2101, the LTFM typically does not project 
fiscal balances and stocks beyond 2051 (year ending June).  This is largely because 
outstanding student loans, which will influence the borrowing requirement, are not 
currently projected beyond 2051.  
Second, the LTFM projections start at the end of a set of short-term economic and fiscal 
forecasts.  The Treasury’s short-term forecasts typically assume that the economy is at or 
close to trend GDP at the end of the forecast period.  As a result, the projected long-term 
fiscal position is structural and ignores the effects of the business cycle.    
Third, the LTFM does not incorporate any feedback between the fiscal position and 
macroeconomic variables such as productivity or interest rates.     
Fourth, the LTFM assumes a positive inflation rate and results are generally expressed as 
ratios-to-nominal GDP.  As discussed in Section 5.3 below, the effects of inflation on the 
tax take (i.e., fiscal drag) are generally excluded.    
Finally, the version of the LTFM used here is deterministic in that each input (e.g., labour 
productivity growth) is given a single value for each year and the model produces a single 
outcome.  Lee and Edwards (2001) use a stochastic approach to modelling the fiscal 
effects of ageing in the US.  They use time series methods to fit stochastic models for 
input variables such as labour productivity growth, real interest rates and demographics.  
In most cases they constrain the central path for each input variable (i.e., its long-run 
mean) to match the assumptions of agencies like Social Security and the CBO.  Historical 
information provides estimates of the variance of the error term around the imposed 
mean. The stochastic projection uses random draws to assign values to each input in 
each year.  When combined with other components (e.g., cost drivers) these generate a 
stochastic outcome. The projections are run repeatedly (1000 times) and the frequency 
distribution for the outcomes is used to generate a probability distribution of outcomes.  
Recent CBO analysis of the finances of US Social Security uses a similar approach, 
attaching ranges of uncertainty for inputs such as mortality, unemployment, inflation and 
the real interest rate (CBO, 2001).  Modelling uncertainty around inputs into the Treasury’s 
LTFM using stochastic techniques could complement the more typical “what if?” analysis.  
The “what if?” analysis generally considers changes to the trend in input variables as well 
as changes to policy parameters such as the indexation of spending to real wages, or the 
                                                                                                                                              
weights reflect the share of each region in world output. 
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target debt level.  Stochastic analysis requires a careful assessment of the 
interdependence (covariance) of input variables.  
5.1 Demographics 
Demographic projections are a key input to the LTFM and are summarised in Table 2 
(details on the assumptions are in the Appendix).   
Table 2 – Demographics (June years) 
  Population by age group (000)  Dependency ratio (per 100 people in the age group 15-64) 









1981 842  1,977  307  43  15  58 
            
1999 (Base)  875  2,490  446  35  18  53 
2001 878  2,526  457  35  18  53 
2021 775  2,819  781  27  28  55 
2041 763  2,709  1,170  28  43  71 
2061 737  2,618  1,221  28  47  75 
2081 697  2,530  1,190  28  47  75 
2101 674  2,413  1,152  28  48  76 
Note: 1981 is historical and based on a De Facto population definition. From 1999 the definition is Resident population. Projections are 
Series 4 (see Appendix for details).  
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
The elderly dependency ratio embodied in the LTFM increases from around 18 (per 100 
people in the age group 15-64) in 2001 to 43 in 2041.  The increasing proportion of the 
population aged over 65 is due partly to the “baby boom” generation passing into higher 
age groups, and also to the effects of increasing longevity and falling fertility.  By 2061 the 
elderly dependency ratio is projected to reach 47 and there is less change after this point.     
The effect of the increase in the elderly dependency ratio on the total dependency ratio is 
partially offset by the decline in the child dependency ratio.  The fall in the child 
dependency ratio dominated during the 1980 to 2000 period.  Thereafter, the increase in 
the elderly dependency ratio dominates.  Nevertheless, the total dependency does not 
reach the 1981 level until around 2021.  However, the composition is quite different.   
Raw dependency ratios do not necessarily capture “economic dependence” – some 
people aged 15-64 are not in employment, some aged over 65 are.  The LTFM allows for 
this by incorporating projections of the labour force that are derived using age group 
specific labour force participation rates.  These labour force projections are combined with 
assumed long-run rates of unemployment and productivity growth to determine real 
economic output.  In addition, the LTFM builds in the change in the composition of the 
population and the fact that government spending differs across age groups.    
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5.2 Expense  assumptions 
Long-term fiscal scenarios generated by the LTFM use a “bottom-up” approach to 
expense and tax revenue assumptions.
9
  Expenses are projected by functional 
classification (e.g., social security, health, education, law and order).  Some of these 
classifications are influenced by demographic changes and are projected on an age-
related basis.  For example, health expenses are influenced by numbers in particular age 
groups and the amount spent on each age group.  Per person expenses for health, 
education, and social welfare transfers are assumed to increase in pre-specified real per 
capita terms.  This increase generally equals the assumed rate of increase in real wages 
and hence growth of labour productivity.  There are several major items that are sensitive 
to population projections and are expected to have an important effect on the expenditure 
profile: New Zealand Superannuation (NZS), Health, Education, and Social welfare.      
The projected number of retirees and legislation regarding entitlements determines 
expenses for public pensions (that is, NZS).  Payments of NZS are currently linked to 
nominal wages and so to real wages and labour productivity.   
A number of factors make the projection of health expenses uncertain.  The LTFM 
assumes static cost weights for health spending.
10
  There is uncertainty as to whether 
longer life expectancies will see extended periods of health care at higher age brackets or 
whether costs will be shifted to later years of life (the “proximity to death” issue).  Static 
age-related spending profiles may overestimate the impact of ageing on health spending.  
On the other hand, the LTFM assumes that the weights increase in line with real wages 
and labour productivity.  This may underestimate future health costs if the long-term 
elasticity of health spending to per capita income is greater than one.  Although 
technological advances may work to reduce medical costs for specific procedures, this 
may result in the procedures being applied to a greater proportion of patients and thereby 
increasing total costs (see Lee and Skinner, 1999).  
Education is the other major expenses area influenced by demographics.  Social welfare 
transfers (e.g., unemployment) are influenced by the rate of “take-up” and grow with 
wages (so as to avoid a significant decline in benefits-to-wages over the long term).     
Expenses not directly influenced by demographics, such as core government, law and 
order, and defence grow at a specified real rate.   
Compared to NZS, which has a legislated link to wages and an age of eligibility, the 
assumptions for other areas are more problematic.  There is uncertainty surrounding 
demographic and economic assumptions, technological change, behavioural responses 
and the role of future governments in providing particular goods, services and transfers.  
Given their labour content, and in the absence of major changes to input structure (e.g., 
capital-labour ratios), health, education and other expenses will in the long-term be 
influenced by wage growth.     
                                                
9
   The use of the bottom-up approach means that fiscal aggregates are not directly comparable to the 10-
year projections in Fiscal Strategy Reports (see Annex 3 of the Fiscal Strategy Report 2001 for details).  
10
   Health cost weights are estimated for age-by-gender groups (e.g., 0-5 year old females) for seven 
expense categories. Although the dollar value of the per-person cost rises with inflation and the real growth 
factor, the weights are unchanged (i.e., the profile across the age structure is assumed to be constant). Dang, 
Antolin and Oxley (2001) canvas some of the alternative approaches used by countries to model health costs. 
The issue of long-term health projections is also discussed in detail by the European Commission (2001).  
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5.3  Tax revenue assumptions 
In “bottom-up” mode average effective tax rates are assumed to remain constant.   Effects 
on the tax take arising from the interaction of rising incomes and the progressive tax 
system are therefore not modelled (i.e., there is no “fiscal drag” or “bracket creep”).
11
  In 
the presence of inflation, this assumption is equivalent to assuming labour income tax 
brackets are inflation-indexed.  Possible changes to the tax base are implicitly offset by 
revenue neutral policy changes (tax scales are implicitly “indexed” because there is 
inflation).
12
   
5.4  Capital, debt and interest rate assumptions  
In GAAP, capital expenditure is treated as a financing item that affects debt but is not 
included in the Statement of Financial Performance (and hence the operating balance), 
which instead records a non-cash depreciation expense.  The LTFM assumes that 
replacement assets are purchased to maintain depreciating assets (so that non-cash 
depreciation is neutral in terms of the gross debt calculation).   In essence, this shifts the 
projected operating balance towards a cash balance after investing activities.  Over and 
above this, the LTFM in “bottom-up” mode allows for some increase in physical assets 
(see Appendix for details).
13
  
In the LTFM, fiscal surpluses over and above capital and investing requirements are used 
to pay back gross debt, specifically New Zealand-dollar debt.  (The New Zealand dollar 
value of foreign-currency debt is held constant at the level of the last year of the fiscal 
forecasts - with offsetting foreign-currency assets to ensure net foreign-currency debt is 
around zero).  If New Zealand-dollar debt is fully repaid, and the level of foreign-currency 
debt is held constant, the government starts to accumulate “financial assets arising from 
debt elimination”.  Should fiscal deficits re-emerge it is these financial assets that are used 
to finance the shortfall.  Once they are extinguished, gross debt increases through an 
increase in domestic debt.  
The fiscal gap targets a definition of gross debt-to-GDP that allows for these additional 
financial assets.  This target variable becomes negative when additional assets are 
accumulated (see Figure 4).    
Finally, it should be noted that in general the LTFM assumes dynamic efficiency with r > g.  
Various differences between the interest rate and the economic growth rate can be 
considered as alternative scenarios.  Drawing on the discussion in Section 4.2, the 
                                                
11
   In a tax system where marginal tax rates exceed average tax rates, changes in GDP will bring about 
more than proportionate changes in tax revenues. Rising incomes will see an increasing proportion of 
taxpayers paying the higher tax rate at the margin and those already on the higher rate being taxed at this on 
an increasing share of their income. The tax-to-GDP ratio will increase under a progressive tax system without 
full indexing for the growth of per capita income. Both the CBO and the UK Treasury (Miners, 2000) assume a 
constant tax-to-GDP ratio.  
12
   NZS and social welfare transfers are paid on a gross of tax basis, and this is reflected in total expenses 
and tax revenues (which increases by around one percentage point of GDP over 50 years).    
13
   In 2006 this increase amounts to $1 billion (or 0.7% of GDP). This additional capital spending is 
conceptually equivalent to the capital contingency provision in the short-term fiscal forecasts (although it is 
allocated solely to physical assets and not to advances or deficit financing). It remains at around 0.6% to 0.7% 
of GDP over the period to 2051.     
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Baseline scenario assumes a real interest rate of 5%.
14
  Estimates of generational 
accounts for New Zealand have used real interest rate assumptions of 7%, 5% and 3% 
(see Baker, 1999 and the discussion in Section 2.4 of Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1999).   
Given typical assumptions about labour productivity growth and labour input growth, these 
rates are above the real GDP growth rate.  Wells (1996) also assumes that the economy 
operates in an efficient region (using r = 5% and g = 3.2%).  The LTFM also applies the 
long-term government bond rate to both debt and “financial assets arising from debt 
elimination”.     
6  Fiscal gap calculations   
This section presents estimates of the fiscal gap generated using the LTFM.  The fiscal 
gap scenarios are based on assumed paths for revenues and expenses explained in 
Section 5.  There can be a tension between what is assumed and what a particular 
Government might seek to achieve.  Governments always retain the option to adjust both 
policy settings and financing approaches.  The analysis that follows is designed therefore 
to illustrate the long-term implications for fiscal balances and debt if current policy settings 
remain unchanged, and the change in policy settings that would be required to satisfy the 
IBC.    
6.1   The unconstrained Baseline scenario  
In equation (8) the initial debt ratio is used as the relevant target for time T.   Given an 
exogenous track for the primary balance, the approach taken is to calculate the fiscal gap 
under a target where the gross debt ratio returns to its current level of around 30% of 
GDP.  (The Appendix provides an explanation of the relationship between gross and net 
debt.)  Alternative scenarios examine how the fiscal gap varies with alternative expense 
growth assumptions, terminal debt targets, real interest rates, productivity, unemployment 
and net migration.  The analysis is assumed to be independent of specific government 
fiscal objectives and financing approaches.  The underlying profiles for tax revenues and 
non-finance expenses are assumed to be exogenous to the financing choice.  Partial pre-
funding of New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) through the NZS Fund can be seen as a 
financing choice.
15
  The path of the actual primary balance may differ in the absence of 
the Fund.  So, while the analysis below generally removes the Fund and allocates 
surpluses to debt reduction, this implies that primary expenses and taxes do not change.   
Details of the assumptions for the scenarios are provided in the Appendix.  Until 2005, all 
the scenarios are largely based on the four-year fiscal forecasts in the Budget Economic 
and Fiscal Update 2001.   Table 3 sets out the starting position for the key fiscal flows and 
balances. 
                                                
14
   In the LTFM, the level of the long-run real interest rate is set exogenously and the nominal interest rate 
is determined via a Fisher relationship. In the long-term, Consumer Price Inflation is assumed to average  
1.5% per year, as is GDP deflator inflation. The model does not incorporate any relationship between the 
projected fiscal position and interest rates (say via an increased risk premium).  
15
   For details on the financing arrangements created by the Fund, see McCulloch and Frances (2001).  
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Table 3 – Revenues, expenses and fiscal balances (Forecasts for year ending June 
2005)  
  $ million  % of GDP 
Tax revenues (a)  43,468  32.3 
Compulsory fees, fines, penalties and levies (b)  475  0.3 
Sales of goods and services, other operational income (c)  893  0.7 
Investment income  1,265  0.9 
Total revenues  46,101  34.3 
    
Total expenses  43,410  32.2 
    
Revenues less expenses  2,691  2.0 
    
Net surplus of State-owned Enterprises & Crown Entities  918  0.7 
    
Operating balance  3,609  2.7 
    
Finance costs  2,022  1.5 
Non-finance expenses (d)  41,388  30.8 
    
“Primary” balance ( = a + b + c – d )  3,448  2.6 
Memo items     
Depreciation (Physical Assets and State Highways)  926  0.7 
Purchase of physical assets  846  0.6 
Capital contingency provision  850  0.6 
    
Nominal GDP  134,563   
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Investment income includes dividend income. Adjusted to remove NZS Fund. Purchase of 
physical assets is net of sales.  
Source: Adapted from Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2001. 
Although the primary balance in Table 3 excludes finance costs and investment income, it 
does not translate directly into changes in debt as per the equations of the text. The LTFM 
incorporates a range of factors that influence the borrowing requirement (see Appendix).  
Table 4 below sets out the starting position for the key fiscal stocks.  
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Table 4 – Assets, liabilities and fiscal stocks (Forecasts for year ending June 2005)  
 $million  %  of  GDP 
Financial assets   16,555  12.3 
State-owned Enterprises and Crown Entities  18,204  13.5 
Physical Assets  18,754  13.9 
State Highways  11,410  8.5 
Other 5,921  4.4 
Total assets  70,844  52.6 
    
Gross debt   34,181  25.4 
Pension liabilities  8,477  6.3 
Other 7,110  5.3 
Total liabilities  49,768  36.9 
    
Net worth  21,076  15.7 
    
Memo items     
New Zealand-dollar debt  26,879  20.0 
Foreign-currency debt  7,302  5.4 
    
Nominal GDP  134,563   
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Adjusted to remove NZS Fund. Financial assets include outstanding student loans. State-
owned enterprises and Crown entities are combined using the equity method (i.e., amount recorded is net worth). Physical assets 
include inventories, commercial forests, intangible assets and the cumulated capital contingency. Pension liabilities are the unfunded 
portion of public sector employee pensions (primarily the Government Superannuation Fund, which is closed to new entrants).  The 
net liability of ACC is included in the State-owned Enterprises and Crown Entities line.  
Source: Adapted from Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2001. 
To provide an indication of longer-term fiscal imbalances and their implications for debt, 
the Baseline scenario is run unconstrained, that is under the expense and tax revenue 
assumptions outlined in Section 5 above.   In the Baseline scenario, NZS is determined by 
the assumptions detailed above and other demographically influenced expense categories 
assume real per capita growth of 1.5% per year.  This can be thought of as a “wage-
indexed” scenario because 1.5% is the labour productivity growth assumption.  This, 
together with other assumptions in the model means that changes in labour productivity 
growth do not generally alter the share of government spending to GDP.  Labour 
productivity growth enters the numerator (expenses) and the denominator (GDP).   
Non-finance expenses are projected to increase from 31% of GDP in 2005 to 40% in 
2051.  The increase is largely attributable to the effects of population ageing on NZS and 
Health expenses (refer Figure 1).   The cost of NZS is projected to rise from over 4% of 
GDP currently to over 10% of GDP over the next 50 years.  Education declines somewhat 
as a share of GDP (reflecting the demographics in Table 2) while Social welfare and Other 
expenses show little change.    
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Figure 1 – Baseline: Non-finance expenses by functional classification (% of GDP) 
 
This Baseline expense projection combined with the revenue assumptions yields the 
projected paths for the operating and “primary” balances shown in Figure 2.
 
 
Under the Baseline assumptions, “primary” surpluses are maintained for almost two 
decades and so provide a degree of tax-smoothing as debt-to-GDP continues to fall below 
initial levels.  The difference between the primary balance and the operating balance is 
attributable to finance costs (which are excluded from the calculation of the primary 
balance and which decline as debt is reduced) and investment income (which is also 
excluded from the calculation of the primary balance).  
However, primary surpluses switch to primary deficits by the year 2020, and eventually 
the deficit rises to 5.2% of GDP by 2051.  By this time, projected gross debt has increased 
to around 215% of GDP and finance costs are around 13% of GDP.  These changes are 
reflected in a large operating deficit and negative net worth (the latter reaches minus 
154% of GDP in 2051).
16
  The eventually larger and continuously rising operating deficit 
(compared to the primary deficit) reflects the impact of an ongoing rise in debt and debt 
servicing costs (finance costs).  Overall, while projected primary surpluses reduce debt 
and finance costs initially, the reduction in debt servicing is insufficient to offset the longer-
term increase in primary expenses.    
                                                
16
   Apart from gross debt, the components of net worth are identical across all scenarios (see Appendix). 
This means that differences in net worth across scenarios simply reflect differences in gross debt. Note that 
the levels of the operating balance and net worth are influenced by the modelling of the Earthquake 
Commission (EQC). The EQC retains all its operating surplus and no allowance is made for the cost of a 
major earthquake. The result is an asset growing at a strong compounding rate. Although this is neutral in 
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Figure 2 – Unconstrained Baseline: Primary and operating balances (% of GDP) 
 
6.2  Fiscal gap scenarios  
The fiscal gap calculates the change in fiscal policy settings needed to achieve a 
particular debt target at some point in the future.  In the following scenario analysis, the 
initial year for the calculations is 2006 (the first year after the BEFU 2001 forecasts).  The 
calculated fiscal gap is the permanent change in the primary balance needed from 2006 to 
achieve the target gross debt ratio in the terminal year.  
The LTFM calculates the fiscal gap by making a discrete change to taxes to ensure a 
particular debt-to-GDP target at the end of the projection period (i.e., T ).  The difference 
between this new tax-to-GDP ratio and the tax-to-GDP ratio in the unconstrained Baseline 
projection is the implied change in the primary balance.  The change could alternatively be 
implemented via an equivalent permanent change in the primary expense-to-GDP ratio, or 
some combination of tax and spending changes. 
Table 5 sets out the fiscal gap calculations for the Baseline scenario, together with those 
for alternative scenarios that incorporate other fiscal and economic assumptions.   Each 
alternative scenario is a complete run of the LTFM with an alternative set of assumptions 
to the Baseline.  The objective is to evaluate what the fiscal gap calculation is sensitive to 
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Table 5 – Fiscal gaps under alternative scenarios, terminal year = 2051 (% of GDP) 
Baseline 
“Wage-linked” non-finance expense track (labour productivity growth of 1.5%, Health and Education grow at 1.5% 








Higher spending  





Lower debt target 
Baseline with zero gross debt-to-GDP in terminal year 
 
1.82 
Higher debt target  
Baseline with gross debt at 60% of GDP in terminal year 
 
1.31 
Lower interest rate 
Baseline with real interest rate = 3% 
 
1.96 
Higher interest rate  
Baseline with real interest rate = 7% 
 
1.21 
Lower net migration  
Baseline with zero net migration assumption 
 
1.96 
Higher net migration  
Baseline with high net migration assumption 
 
1.04 
Delayed adjustment  








Baseline with unemployment rate = 7% 
 
2.11 
Note: In the unconstrained Baseline scenario, tax revenue-to-GDP is 32.3% in 2006 (which is the initial year for all scenarios excepting 
the delayed adjustment). The fiscal gap is the “% of GDP” added to this ratio.  
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6.2.1 Baseline  scenario 
The expense and tax revenue assumptions in the Baseline scenario generate a fiscal gap 
(∆ pb from Equation 8) of 1.57% of GDP, for a 30% gross debt target in 2051.  The gap is 
positive, implying either a permanent increase in taxes-to-GDP and/or reduction in 
expenses-to-GDP.  When interpreting this gap it should be remembered that the implied 
change is implemented in 2006 and is permanent, so that the required path of primary 
balances is maintained through to the terminal year.  To place the 1.57% in perspective, 
recall that a zero fiscal gap in the initial year would simply indicate that the Baseline 
projected primary balances are sufficient to achieve the target debt-to-GDP ratio in the 
terminal year.  For terminal dates up until around 2030, calculated fiscal gaps are negative 
(see Table 6). 





2031   0.14 
2036   0.60 
2041   1.01 
2046   1.33 
2051   1.57 
The negative fiscal gaps indicate that the projected path of (unconstrained) primary 
balances (as in Figure 2) are yielding a reduction in debt-to-GDP.  Although this would 
suggest that the primary surplus could be reduced, a longer-term perspective changes 
this result as population ageing starts to impact.   
Figure 3 plots the primary and operating balances under fiscal gap closure (with a terminal 
year of 2051).  In effect, the primary balance has been shifted up by ∆ pb and the new path 
of the operating balance reflects the changed paths of finance costs and asset returns.  
The fiscal gap calculation to 2051 involves significant changes in the path of debt relative 
to the unconstrained case (that is where fiscal gap is “open”).  For example, in the 
calculation to 2051, (domestic) debt is eliminated and there is a significant, although 
temporary, accumulation of financial assets (peaking at around 35% of GDP in 2030).   
Net worth increases from around 16% of GDP in 2005 to a peak of 86%, before declining 
to 31% as assets are drawn down and gross debt re-emerges.     
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Figure 3 – Baseline with fiscal gap closure: Primary and operating balances (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 4 – Baseline with fiscal gap closure: Gross debt (allowing for financial 
assets from debt elimination) (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 3 indicates that in the selected terminal year the primary deficit is running at around 
3.7% of GDP.  Although financial assets have been accumulated, they are drawn down, 
and by the terminal year the trajectory of debt-GDP is not stable (as illustrated in Figure 
4).  Because the elderly dependency ratio increases less rapidly after 2051 (refer Table 
2), using population projections out to 2101 would see a projected slowdown in non-
finance expense growth beyond 2051.  Non-finance expenses-to-GDP would tend to 
stabilise, albeit at a higher level than projected over the next few decades.  For a constant 
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Given that the primary balance is projected to be in deficit in 2051, and assuming it 
remains in deficit after this date, extending the time horizon will see a larger fiscal gap 
than that reported in Table 5.  Although primary deficits in the distant future are small in 
present value terms, the assumption that they persist means there are a lot of them.  The 
present value of primary surpluses in the intervening years must be higher than in the 
case where a shorter time horizon is selected (say T = 2051).  As a result, the extent of 
financial asset accumulation will be larger.   
The NZS Fund 
If the NZS Fund is included in the LTFM, it is assumed that the primary balance track 
does not change and projected primary surpluses are effectively channelled into the Fund 
rather than debt reduction.  As a result, gross debt-to-GDP initially increases compared to 
the case where there is no Fund, although net worth still rises because of increasing Fund 
assets.  Although the drawdown of Fund assets partially covers future NZS expenses, 
other spending pressures arising from the remaining pay-go element of NZS, as well as 
health, start to increase primary expenses.  By around 2041, gross debt increases to over 
100% of GDP.  (It is important to note that the Fund is a partial pre-funding device and is 
not intended to deal with the full extent of projected expense increases – a point 
recognised in the Fiscal Strategy Report 2000, pages 19 and 24). 
The inclusion of the Fund alters the projected path of operating balances and net worth 
relative to the Baseline case where there is no Fund.  This is largely due to the tax paid by 
the Fund (to the Crown) on its investment income (where that gross return is assumed to 
exceed the cost of borrowing).  The Crown benefits from the tax on gross investment 
returns in the year the investment income is earned (while the Fund grows by the net 
return).  
Nonetheless, under the Baseline scenario assumptions, the inclusion of the NZS Fund 
does not alter the underlying mismatch between expenses and revenues.  Under a 30% 
gross debt target in 2051, the fiscal gap is still positive at 1.26% of GDP.     
6.2.2  Alternative spending scenarios 
There is always a question about what constitutes the current “baseline” policy 
assumption for long-term scenarios.   
In the case of the Lower spending scenario, non-finance expenses rise to 37% of GDP in 
2051 and the fiscal gap is 0.42% of GDP.  For the Higher spending scenario, non-finance 
expenses increase to 44% of GDP in 2051 and the fiscal gap is 2.88%.   (Recall that non-
finance expenses increase to 40% of GDP in the Baseline.)  
Although the Lower spending scenario generates a lower fiscal gap, it should be noted 
that it still implies a sustained period of primary surpluses (although the surpluses are 
smaller than they otherwise would need to be).  In addition, the expense profile may imply 
policy changes relative to the Baseline.  For example, in the Lower spending scenario, 
real per capita spending on Health and Education grows at 1% per year.  This compares 
to assumed economy-wide productivity (and real wage) growth of 1.5%.  Real per capita 
spending growth of 1% is also below recent historical averages.  For example, over the 
period 1994/95 to 1998/99, real expense growth per capita in Health and Compulsory 
Education averaged 3.8% and 2.8% respectively (see Table 4 in Woods, 2000).  
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6.2.3  Alternative debt-to-GDP scenarios 
Changing the debt objective has a limited effect on the calculated fiscal gap.  Imposing a 
zero gross debt-to-GDP target sees the fiscal gap increase from 1.57% to 1.82% of GDP.  
A more relaxed gross debt target (60% of GDP) sees the fiscal gap fall from 1.57% to 
1.31% for T = 2051.  These results reflect the fact that only small changes in the tax-to-
GDP ratio, when implemented now, are needed to achieve a particular debt ratio in 2051.   
6.2.4  Alternative interest rate scenarios 
The “Lower interest rate” scenario in Table 5 adopts the Baseline assumptions with the 
exception that the real interest rate (and nominal rate given an unchanged inflation 
assumption) is lowered to 3% so that it is closer to the rate of economic growth (see 
Appendix).  The differential at 2051 falls from around 3.5 percentage points in the 
Baseline, to around 1.5 percentage points in the Lower alternative.  In the “Higher interest 
rate” scenario the real interest rate is 7% and the differential at 2051 increases from 
around 3.5 percentage points to 5.5.  
Under both of the alternative interest rate assumptions, fiscal gaps at shorter time 
horizons follow the pattern shown in Table 6.  The fiscal gaps are negative until around 
2030 and then become positive.  For terminal dates up until around 2030, primary 
surpluses dominate the calculations.  Reducing the real interest rate in this period sees a 
slightly larger negative fiscal gap compared to the Baseline assumption (and so there is 
more scope to reduce the primary surplus).  Increasing the real interest rate during this 
period sees slightly smaller negative gaps.   
However, as the time horizon goes out to 2051 there are increasingly more primary 
deficits in the calculation.   By 2051, reducing the real interest rate sees the fiscal gap 
increase relative to the Baseline, from 1.57% to 1.96%.  Increasing the real interest rate 
reduces the gap from 1.57% to 1.21%.   
6.2.5  Alternative net migration scenarios  
Alternative net migration assumptions will change demographics projections.  These 
demographic changes will then influence the size of the labour force, and all other things 
being equal, the level of GDP and tax revenues.  On the expense side, demographic 
changes associated with alternative net migration assumptions will influence age-related 
spending, with the composition influenced by the age and gender mix of migrants.  
The Baseline scenario uses a medium net migration assumption of 5,000 per year.  A 
zero net migration assumption sees the fiscal gap rise to 1.96% (the labour force effect is 
dominating the expense effect).  Higher net migration of 10,000 generates a lower (but still 
positive) fiscal gap of 1.04%.     
6.2.6  Delayed adjustment scenario 
Both Auerbach (1997) and the CBO consider scenarios where the fiscal gap is calculated 
at some point beyond the initial year (and so closer to T ).  Given the profile of primary  
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The Delayed Adjustment scenario in Table 5 uses 2026 as the year in which the tax 
change is implemented.  This choice is arbitrary and simply reflects the approximate mid-
point of the projection horizon.  As expected, delaying the adjustment means that the 
change in the primary balance needed from 2026 is larger, with the fiscal gap rising to 
4.24%.  This scenario assumes that the path of primary balances in the period prior to 
2026 is as per the unconstrained Baseline, which sees debt-to-GDP declining.   
6.2.7  Starting point and other sensitivities 
The CBO results discussed in Section 3 show how changes in 10-year projections 
influence the fiscal gap with each successive calculation. In the New Zealand context, 
long-term fiscal scenarios start at the end of a set of short-term fiscal forecasts.  The 
LTFM effectively “straight-lines” many of the key economic and fiscal parameters from the 
end-of-forecast position.  Changes in the base (especially taxes) between forecasts will be 
permanent  across the time horizon considered.  This suggests that successive 
calculations of the fiscal gap through time should consider whether changes to key ratios 
are permanent (recall the CBO use of historic tax-to-GDP ratios).   Section 7.2 discusses 
how revisions to fiscal gaps through time should be interpreted.   
Changes to some structural parameters will also influence the fiscal gap.  For example, 
assuming a long-term unemployment rate of 5% instead of 6% results in a lower, but still 
positive fiscal gap of 1.03%.  With other key factors held constant (e.g., labour force 
growth and productivity growth), lower unemployment will see higher employment, a 
higher level of GDP and higher taxes.  Unemployment expenses will also be lower.  
Assuming higher labour productivity growth does not necessarily lower the fiscal gap 
because of the link through to real wages and most expense assumptions.  For example, 
assuming labour productivity growth of 2% (and increasing assumed real per capita 
expense growth rates to match) still generates a positive fiscal gap of 1.76%.  The 




7  Policy issues   
This section discusses some of the issues surrounding the interpretation of the fiscal gap 
that might influence its presentation and use as a long-term fiscal indicator.   Applications 
of the fiscal gap have tended to emphasise its role as a “fiscal indicator”.  For example, 
solutions to a long-term fiscal imbalance require adjustments in specific taxes and/or 
expenditure programmes.  But a necessary first step is to understand the size of the 
                                                
17
   For a group of 19 OECD countries, Roseveare, Leibfritz, Fore and Wurzel (1996) calculate changes in 
the tax-to-GDP ratio needed to keep net debt constant (see their Table 6. New Zealand is not included in the 
analysis). The required change generally increases as the time horizon is pushed out.  
18
   The fiscal gap result is not strictly comparable to the Baseline calculation because altering labour 
productivity (all other things equal) also changes the differential between r and g. With higher labour 
productivity the differential is reduced. Adjusting the real interest rate upward to match the productivity growth 
change results in a fiscal gap of 1.66% (cf the Baseline of 1.56%).      
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imbalance and how large the adjustments must be in the aggregate (Auerbach, 1997).  
Further, the fiscal gap is an illustrative device for measuring the magnitude of long-term 
budgetary imbalances, not a prescription for policy (CBO, 1998).  However, the 
uncertainty around fiscal gap calculations needs to be considered when assessing policy 
changes.    
7.1 Uncertainty 
Auerbach (1994) notes the natural response of policymakers to downplay long-term 
projections of the fiscal gap type because they involve considerable uncertainty.  He 
argues that this uncertainty could be more explicitly recognised through the calculation of 
confidence intervals based on making explicit the stochastic nature of the projections (see 
for example Lee and Skinner, 1999; Lee and Edwards, 2001; CBO, 2001).   
Furthermore, Auerbach suggests that even with unbiased projections, the prospect that 
things are just as likely to be “worse” than forecast as they are to be “better” should in the 
face of risk aversion generate more immediate action.   Auerbach and Hassett (1999) 
provide a more explicit model of fiscal policy under uncertainty.  They suggest that the 
consequences of relatively “bad” long-term fiscal outcomes argues for accelerated action, 
with some precautionary saving in addition to whatever changes are needed to respond to 
expected fiscal imbalances.  
7.2   Policy adjustment 
Auerbach (1994, 1997) makes two important points about policy adjustments.  First, 
permanent time horizon fiscal gaps calculated at a particular date t indicate the size of the 
permanent change in the primary balance-to-GDP (∆ ) needed for currently projected fiscal 
settings to satisfy the government’s IBC.  This change will satisfy the IBC if the projections 
at date t prove to be accurate.  But a trajectory for primary balances based on ∆  may not 
satisfy the IBC in year t + 1 once projections are revised.  If the revisions to variables such 
as growth rates and other economic variables are assumed to be unpredictable, the 
process for ∆  t, ∆  t+1, ∆  t+2,… will follow a random walk.   
With perfect foresight, the strict tax-smoothing mode of Barro (1979) implies constant tax 
rates.  But in the presence of uncertainty, new information leads to a revision of tax rates 
and tax-smoothing implies that tax rates would follow a random walk.  This might suggest 
a policy of implementing each period’s ∆  immediately and as a consequence letting the 
tax rate follow a random walk.   Tax rates would be revised on the basis of the new 
information affecting the fiscal gap.  This will ensure that only small changes (spread over 
time) are needed, thereby minimising deadweight losses.  This might be tempered by the 
infeasibility or undesirability of frequent changes in tax rates because of short-term 
macroeconomic considerations. 
The CBO calculations of the fiscal gap suggest that ∆  is influenced by revisions to 
projections (as illustrated in Table 1 above). Note that large expected events like 
population ageing are already incorporated into the projections of the primary balance.  
Auerbach argues that the fact that the fiscal gap will change does not alter the fact that it 
is an optimal forecast at date t.  
Changes in the fiscal gap resulting from projection updates will capture a range of factors.  
These will include “forecasting changes”, such as those around the levels of taxes and  
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spending to GDP.  However, changes in the starting point will also reflect structural policy 
decisions.  For example, a decision to lower taxes will, without a corresponding change in 
spending, increase the fiscal gap (as the tax change will be modelled as permanent).  
Presentation of fiscal gap calculations through time should ideally decompose changes 
into their key sources.  
Secondly, although uncertainty might suggest that governments deal with future fiscal 
problems closer to when they occur, Auerbach (1997) argues that the problem already 
has occurred.  In this view, short-term fiscal surpluses are a misleading indicator because 
they exist only because accounting methods ignore the accruing liabilities of future 
entitlement benefits.  Delaying policy adjustment until measured deficits increase will 
require even larger adjustments to policy settings that are less desirable on both efficiency 
and equity grounds. 
8 Concluding  remarks     
Long-term debt projections generated by a model like the Treasury’s LTFM are not always 
useful in communicating the extent of implied policy change.   Resolving this issue 
requires a consideration of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (IBC), which 
requires that all government spending must eventually be financed, either in the current 
period through taxes or over time through interest on debt.   The fiscal gap calculates the 
change in fiscal policy settings needed to achieve a particular debt target at some point in 




First, like most current assessments of sustainability, the fiscal gap provides only a partial 
analysis.  This is largely because theory and evidence provide limited insight on the long-
run relationships between the fiscal position and variables like productivity growth.  
Second, the fiscal gap involves arbitrary choices about the target debt-to-GDP ratio (as in 
Table 5) and the time horizon (as in Table 6).  This reinforces Auerbach’s argument in 
favour of an infinite time horizon and permanent fiscal gap.         
Third, because it is a numerical indicator, the fiscal gap does not convey the timing of 
fiscal pressures.  It is important to compliment the indicator with time-plots of projected 
fiscal aggregates.  
Fourth, fiscal gaps will typically involve a sequence of debt reduction, and possibly 
(temporary) asset accumulation.  A fiscal gap indicator says nothing about the gains of a 
particular financing approach (e.g., efficiency gains from tax-smoothing) or the potential 
difficulties involved (e.g., sustaining fiscal surpluses, management of a large pool of 
assets).   
On this last point, the economic and policy issues surrounding population ageing are 
complex (see Turner et. al., 1998; OECD, 2001; Visco, 2001) and go well beyond what 
can be captured in a single numerical indicator like the fiscal gap.    Despite the above 
caveats, the fiscal gap can indicate, in a numerical sense, the potential size of long-term 
imbalances between taxes and spending under reasonable policy assumptions −  including 
                                                
19
   The first three points are based on Balassone and Franco (2000).  
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those considered here, namely broadly constant tax-to-GDP and productivity-linked 
expense growth.  The provision of alternative scenarios allows users to judge the 
seriousness of any fiscal imbalance based on their views on the path of taxes, spending, 
interest rates and other variables.  
The fiscal gap can illustrate the direction of fiscal policy adjustment, the broad magnitude 
of that adjustment and how it changes through time.  Such a measure can supplement 
existing indicators such as the balanced-budget tax rate which calculates the tax-to-GDP 
ratio needed annually to ensure the stability of a particular debt-to-GDP ratio (for example, 
see Figure 15.1 in Baker, 1999).  
The fiscal gap can indicate the intertemporal consequences of fiscal policy.  For example, 
adopting a wait-and-see approach may impose large adjustments further down the track 
(as in Table 5).  Similarly, reductions in the primary balance (say through tax reductions or 
spending increases) may be consistent with a desired debt-to-GDP ratio over the medium-
term.  But, extending the time horizon could indicate that such a decision would increase 
the size of future imbalances (as in Table 6).   Because the LTFM assumes that the 
interest rate and GDP are independent of the fiscal gap, the gaps prime purpose is to 
highlight the intertemporal distribution of fiscal policy.    
Finally, the fiscal gap methodology provides a platform for the further examination of long-
term fiscal imbalances under a wider range of assumptions (e.g., demographics, labour 
force participation, health spending) and modelling techniques (e.g., stochastic analysis).   
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Appendix: Assumptions and model details 
Until 2005, all fiscal gap scenarios are largely based on the four-year fiscal forecasts in 
the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2001.   
Economic assumptions 
Table A.1 summarises the economic assumptions in the short-term forecasts and long-
term scenarios.     
Table A.1 – Key economic assumptions (years ending June) 
 2002 2003  2004 2005  2006-  2051 
(average) 
Real GDP growth (% change)  2.7 3.4  2.9 2.8  1.6 
Nominal GDP growth (% change)  4.1 5.3  4.5 4.2  3.1 
Labour force growth (% change) 1.2 1.5  1.5 1.2  0.1 
Unemployment rate (Household Labour Force Survey, %)  5.4 5.1  5.1 5.1  6.0 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index,   % change)  2.3 2.3  2.2 1.8  1.5 
Nominal interest rate (10-year Government bonds, %)  7.6 7.5  7.4 6.7  6.5 
Compensation of Employees (% of nominal GDP)    42.5  42.5 
Source: The Treasury, Statistics New Zealand 
Real GDP grows in line with labour productivity (annual growth rate of 1.5%) and 
projected changes in labour input (which move in line with the labour force as rates of 
employment/unemployment and average hours worked are held constant).   
Labour and capital shares of output are held constant at their 2005 ratios (i.e., the 
economy is assumed to be on trend from that point and so business cycle effects are 
ignored).   
Demographic assumptions 
Demographic information comes Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) population projections.   
The labour force projections used to derive labour force growth (in Table A.1 above) are 
also from SNZ.  They are consistent with the population projections and are on 15 years 
and over basis.  The population and labour force projections use a 1999 Base year.  The 
Baseline fiscal gap scenario uses the SNZ “Medium” series population and labour force 
projections.  The key assumptions are given in Table A.2.  
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Table A.2 – Key population and labour force assumptions (years ending June) 
SNZ Medium population and labour force 
scenarios 
1999 Base  2051 
Fertility rate, births per female   1.98  1.90* 
Mortality, male life expectancy at birth  75.2  82.0* 
Mortality, female life expectancy at birth  80.4  86.5* 
Net migration  Long term levels of 5,000 per year 
Labour force participation rates  Rates change until 2011. The rates for males are assumed to continue to 
decrease slightly for most ages 20 to 54 years. For ages 55+, the rates 
increase to reflect changes in the age of eligibility for NZS. For females, rates 
are assumed to continue increasing for most age groups.  However, the pace 
of change slows and after 2011 the rates are assumed to remain stable at 
the 2011 level. 
* Birth rates vary until the year 2011, and then remain unchanged. Mortality rates remain unchanged between 2051 and 2101. 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
For simplicity, the LTFM holds average hours worked, the unemployment rate and labour 
productivity growth constant where in practice these may be influenced by changes in the 
age/gender composition of the labour force.   
Tax revenues and expenses  
The path of tax revenue is driven by nominal GDP growth.  Because capital and labour 
shares of output are held constant, tax bases as shares of GDP also remain constant.    In 
“bottom-up” mode the LTFM assumes the tax system is neutral with respect to nominal 
wage increases and to price inflation (i.e., there is no “fiscal drag”).   
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Table A.3 summarises the expense assumptions used beyond 2005. 
Table A.3  – Key expense assumptions 
  2006 –  
NZS  Demographically influenced and grows in line with wages after reaching 65% of the average 
wage 
Health  Demographically influenced.  Increases at 1.5% a year in real per capita terms in Baseline 
scenario.  Increases at 2% and 1% a year in real per capita terms in Higher Spending and 
Lower Spending scenarios respectively  
Education  Demographically influenced.  Increases at 1.5% a year in real per capita terms in Baseline 
scenario.  Increases at 2% and 1% a year in real per capita terms in Higher Spending and 
Lower Spending scenarios respectively  
Social welfare transfers  Demographically influenced and indexed to wages  
Other  Increase at 1.5% a year in real terms  
Finance costs  A function of debt levels and interest rates 
Source: The Treasury 
The tax and expense assumptions underpin the projections of the operating balance in the 
projected “Statement of Financial Performance”.   
Assets and liabilities 
The LTFM also projects a “Statement of Financial Position”.  Satellite models are used to 
project some of its specific components (e.g., outstanding student loans and the 
outstanding pension liability of government employees).   
As discussed in Section 5.4, the LTFM assumes that replacement assets are purchased 
to maintain depreciating assets (so that depreciation is neutral in terms of the gross debt 
calculation).   
Three items; Physical Assets, State Highways and the net worth of State-owned 
Enterprises and Crown Entities largely represent Crown assets.  Excluding Military 
Equipment, assets at the Crown/Departmental level are largely land and buildings.   
Almost all decisions on physical asset purchases take place outside the budget process, 
by State-owned Enterprises and Crown Entities (funded from retained surpluses and debt) 
or by Departments (funded from depreciation funding in baselines, where funding means 
that an equal amount of depreciation is actually spent on replacement capital goods).   
In the LTFM, Physical Assets increase in line with the growth of Total Other Expenses and 
Defence.  State Highways increase in line with the growth of Total Other Expenses.  As a 
result, the ratio of these expenses to the relevant asset is constant .        
Finally, some items on the balance sheet remain constant in nominal dollar terms and so 
fall relative to GDP (e.g., Receivables and inventories, Payables and provisions, Currency 
issued, and Other financial assets).   
The borrowing requirement (change in gross debt) is determined by the difference 
between the operating balance and changes in assets (e.g., net worth of State-owned 
Enterprises and Crown Entities, advances for student loans, changes in Physical Assets 
and State Highways) and changes in liabilities (other than gross debt).  This captures the 
fact that the operating surplus does not reflect cash available for debt reduction (e.g., the  
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retained surplus of State-owned Enterprises and Crown Entities).   When the operating 
balance exceeds the (net) change in assets and liabilities, the borrowing requirement is 
negative and can be applied to debt reduction or financial asset accumulation.   
Net debt is defined as gross debt less selected “Financial assets”, where in Table 4 these 
comprise Marketable Securities and Deposits (predominantly in foreign-currency), 
advances to State-owned Enterprises and Crown Entities, outstanding student loans, 
other advances and cash.  The selection of financial assets is arbitrary.   
Outstanding student loans increase with continued borrowing and accumulating interest.  
The scheme matures (i.e., outstanding loans level off) as repayments increase.   
Outstanding loans are projected to increase from around 4.5% of GDP currently to 8% by 
2020.  They then tail off slightly to 7% by 2050.  Other financial assets remain constant in 
nominal terms and fall as a share of GDP.   The combination of these changes means that 
“Financial assets” increase from 11.5% of GDP to a peak of around 12.3% before 
returning to around 10%.   As a result, net debt tends to reflect movements in gross debt. 